The three points of security contention for the West; Russia, Iran and China, seemed to become ever closer until recently when Russia stepped aside during the US attack on Iran’s nuclear program. For years, closer ties came with North Korean soldiers and former PLA Chinese mercenaries contributing to Russia’s front with Ukraine, a relationship previously thought to be only as a parts supplier of China to Russia’s industrial base. China’s links in the Middle East and recent moves in becoming a broker between Saudi interests and Iran’s interests ended with an evacuation of the region as entrenched Russian allies fell and international shipping became targets, affecting Russian, Chinese and international trade interests.
Much of the reversal of the Axis came with assertive moves from the US and their allies against ties between Russia, Iran and China. With the US and Europe now fully united in the re-invigoration of NATO and a full defense of Ukraine, moves by the Axis has galvanised the West militarily on the Ukrainian front, in focusing on Iran, and may quickly collect a united front if China was to attack Taiwan or India. A tactical error that would mirror Sweden and Finland’s ascension into NATO would be for China to pressure both NATO and India’s common security interests as India and NATO would rapidly form defensive alliances if either interests faced military pressure from China or their regional allies in Asia.
The lack of success on the battlefield by the Axis may explain other policy developments that are designed to fracture the Western alliance, mostly by playing the Delay Card and forcing internal upheaval in Western countries. The targeting of Western norms, via the normalization of disproportionately eroding actions in local communities, clearly function by permanently altering Western interests and the internal degradation of Western norms. Most of these orchestrated events come about when there is a Western victory or paradigm shift towards Western interests, often countered by leadership in the West that have low approval ratings or are in power due to outside interest campaigns.
The race to tear down the internal strength of Western powers must be juxtaposed with the deterioration of regimes in Russia and China due to age or political divisions within their Cabinets and ruling party politics. It is hoped that stability can hold so that Western countries would not fracture, nor would countries like Russia or China fracture, as it would likely lead to a more complicated security situation in both countries. A fractured Russia and/or China is bad for the West as it would harm both local allies and adversaries of Western powers. The race to the bottom must not hit the floor, as the end result is bad for everyone.
